Criminal Law—Credit for Time Served Denied: \u3ci\u3eState v. King\u3c/i\u3e, 180 Neb. 631, 144 N.W.2d 438 (1966) by Oeltjen, Jarret C.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 3 Article 10
1967
Criminal Law—Credit for Time Served Denied:
State v. King, 180 Neb. 631, 144 N.W.2d 438 (1966)
Jarret C. Oeltjen
University of Nebraska College of Law, jarret.oeltjen@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Jarret C. Oeltjen, Criminal Law—Credit for Time Served Denied: State v. King, 180 Neb. 631, 144 N.W.2d 438 (1966), 46 Neb. L. Rev.
727 (1967)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol46/iss3/10
Casenote
CRIiV.NAL LAW CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED DENIED--State v. King, 180
Neb. 631, 144 N.W.2d 438 (1966).
David King, a thirty-six-year-old Negro with a high school
education, was arrested on March 24, 1959. On the third day of
his detention a preliminary hearing was held. King was formally
charged with the crime of robbery on April 2, 1959. Then on
September 24, 1959, in the District Court for Douglas County, Ne-
braska, defendant King entered a plea of guilty on the advice of
the public defender. The district court rendered a sentence of
eight years in the penitentiary at hard labor.
After five years of incarceration, prisoner King petitioned the
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska for a
writ of habeas corpus. In light of evidence introduced at the hear-
ing, it appeared that King was induced to prepare and sign a state-
ment as to his guilt after being subjected to physical and mental
hazing. It was decided by the district court that the guilty plea
was a result of this illegally obtained statement. Thus, the court
in granting the writ held, on the basis of uncontradicted evidence,
that the plea of guilty entered by petitioner was involuntary as
a matter of law.'
In April, 1965, King was retried by the District Court for Doug-
las County, Nebraska, on the same charge of robbery. After a jury
trial and a verdict of guilty, King was sentenced to a term of four
years at hard labor in the state penitentiary.
The attorney who had represented King at the habeas corpus
proceeding and the retrial, left the case at this time. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska, on defendant's petition, granted King an attor-
ney at state expense for the purpose of perfecting an appeal.
2
On appeal the sole question before the court was whether the
defendant-appellant should be allowed credit for the time served
on the prior void conviction. The Supreme Court of Nebraska,
holding adversely to the appellant, set forth in its opinion the follow-
ing rule of law:
[W]here a conviction and sentence are held void and on a subse-
quent trial a new sentence is imposed, defendant is not entitled to
1 King v. Sigler, Civil No. 763L (D. Neb., filed Dec. 29, 1964).
2 State v. King, 179 Neb. 511, 138 N.W.2d 805 (1965). As a further point
of interest see the dissent. Id. at 512, 138 N.W.2d at 806. The dissenters
felt that the law was settled and they would have refused King an
attorney at state expense, on the basis that the proposed appeal was
without merit.
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credit as a matter of law on the second sentence for the time served
under the original void conviction and sentence. ... The credit-
ing of time in such a situation is a matter of sound judicial dis-
cretion on the part of the sentencing court with which this court
will not interfere .... 3
The court appears to have borrowed the rule of denying credit
from an annotation 4 where it is declared that such a view is in
accord with the numerical majority of case law. The Nebraska
justices espouse this view with little discussion of its origin or ra-
tionale. The denial of credit for time served has been based on
several theories. The more prevalent of these are the "void sen-
tence" doctrine and the "fear of double jeopardy."
The "void sentence" doctrine originated during the develop-
ment of the habeas corpus proceeding as a device for reviewing
criminal convictions.5 The writ would not be granted unless the
proceeding or judgment supporting the process was absolutely void.6
Many courts then extended this prerequisite of absolute voidness
to the extent that they treated time imprisoned under a subse-
quently reversed conviction as though the defendant had never
been sentenced, as if the former proceeding had never existed.
7
The courts had a further reluctance to accord any recognition to
the former proceeding because they feared the subsequent trial
might be barred by double jeopardy." "[I]f it were to be admitted
that the defendant had once been punished, by even a single day in
jail, for the same offense, then the only course would be to re-
lease him absolutely." 9
3 State v. King, 180 Neb. 631, 634, 144 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1966).
4 Id. at 633, 144 N.W.2d at 440.,
5 For a more complete discussion of the background of the "void sen-
tence" doctrine see Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time
Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MixnN. L. REV. 239, 240-43
(1951).
6 McDonald v. Short, 190 Ind. 338, 343, 130 N.E. 536, 537 (1921). Accord,
Franklin v. Biddle, 5 F.2d 19, 21 (8th Cir. 1925); Ex parte Patman, 1
Okla. Crim. 141, 95 P. 622 (1908). See also Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830).
7 "A void sentence is no sentence." Knothe v. State, 115 Neb. 119, 128,
211 N.W. 619, 623 (1926). See also United States v. Harman, 68 Fed.
472, 474 (D. Kan. 1895).
8 Such a feeling was caused from the result in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873), where the court said that: "The common
law not only prohibited a second punishment for the same offense, but
it went further and forbid a second trial for the same offense, whether
the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether in the former
trial he had been acquitted or convicted." See also Whalen, supra,
note 6, at 243.
9 Whalen, supra, note 5, at 243.
728 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 3 (1967)
Even though the rationale underlying the creation of the rule
-a fiction from its inception-is no longer considered applicable to
modern law, the rule still persists. The only apparent reason for
retaining the rule would be a desire to discourage appeals, or at
least to attempt to limit the number of persons applying for post-
conviction remedies.
In the years following World War II (or even since the Betts v.
Brady10 decision in 1942), the United States Supreme Court has
decided numerous cases which set forth certain constitutional rights
and guarantees of accused persons. Although some of these deci-
sions such as Mapp v. Ohio"- were held not to be applicable retro-
actively,12 many have been held to be retroactive in nature.'3 As
many of these guarantees apply to convictions in state courts, the
judges and prosecutors alike might well fear that a large number
of cases may have to be relitigated. They seem to believe the courts
will become overrun with appeals, retrials, and petitions for ha-
beas corpus. It has been estimated that in Florida alone, one retro-
active application of the principle of Gideon v. Wainright14 might re-
sult in the release of 5,093 convicts who had no appointed counsel
at trial.15 The underlying basis may be to dissuade prisoners from
seeking post-conviction remedies; the courts appear to be using a
multiplicity of unfounded reasons and distinctions to support such
decisions as the King case which do, in fact, tend to discourage
prisoners from seeking post-conviction remedies.
One such distinction is made by the court in the King case.
Many of the cases cited by appellant King in his appellate brief
deal with a situation where the conviction was valid but the sen-
tence rendered by the trial court was void. One of these cases,
Freeman v. State,16 sets forth a statement of what the court in
that case considers the "modern rule,"'17 which requires that credit
10 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
11 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
13 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
'4 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15 Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965).
16 87 Idaho 170, 392 P.2d 542 (1964).
17 "In cases dealing with resentencing necessitated by the invalidity of
the original sentence, but not involving a new trial between the first
and second sentence, the courts are not in agreement on the question
whether time served under the first sentence is to be credited against
time served under the second. In some jurisdictions, allowance of such
credit is provided for by statute. In jurisdictions lacking such a stat-
CASENOTE
be granted. The Nebraska court, though, felt it was not to be
guided by this particular line of cases for the simple reason that
the rules were different for a void sentence than they were in the
case of an invalid conviction. Without any discussion of the un-
derlying rationale for such a distinction or whether in either in-
stance credit should or should not be required, the court dis-
missed this line of authority by stating, "it does not involve the
precise question we have before us.'
8
At first glance it seems plausible that such a distinction should
be made, but upon close scrutiny there appears to be little if any
difference. The ultimate result varies little whether the sentence
or the conviction be void; had the defect not been discovered and
subsequently corrected, the prisoner would not have been subjected
to the additional punishment. The state could have no more of a
legitimate interest in granting or denying the defendant credit in
one case than in the other, nor could such a distinction be upheld
on any type of "public policy" argument. The public interest in
appropriate punishment would be identical in either case. If it
be thought that the additional punishment is required for a spe-
cific purpose, i.e., deterrence or rehabilitation, whether or not such
purpose be logical or reasonable, it would have to be applicable in
either instance or render the law arbitrary and highly inconsistent.
Besides the apparent lack of rationale in making such a distinc-
tion between void convictions and void sentences, there is an added
touch of irony in the opinion in that the court cites as authority for
the proposition that the decision in the King case has been the law
of the state for many years, several Nebraska cases all of which deal
with defects in the sentence. 19 The court thus takes the position of
disallowing as authority the appellant's cases which deal with void
sentences, but on the other hand apparently using this same type of
case authority to support its decision. But as explained above,
since the distinction between the results of a void sentence and
that of a void conviction seems arbitrary, such a distinction should
not have been made at all.
Disregarding any inconsistency in using the Nebraska cases as
ute, what appears to be the modem (and it is submitted, the better)
view is that such an allowance is proper." Id. at 184, 392 P.2d at 550,
citing Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1283, 1285 (1954).
18 State v. King, 180 Neb. 631, 633, 144 N.W.2d 438, 439 (1966).
19 McCormick v. State, 71 Neb. 505, 99 N.W. 237 (1904), void or erroneous
sentence; Knothe v. State, 115 Neb. 119, 211 N.W. 619 (1926), double
sentence for same offense; Crommett v. State, 115 Neb. 399, 213 N.W.
743 (1927), conviction valid but invalid judgment; Cole v. Fenton, 103
Neb. 802, 174 N.W. 509 (1919), invalid sentence,
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evidencing the past rule in Nebraska, it is still not at all clear
that they would be binding authority for the proposition before the
court in the King case. Since the most recent case cited was de-
cided in 1927 and none of the Nebraska cases cited was decided
primarily on the credit issue,20 it appears that the court was not
inextricably bound by any precedent. In the absence of Nebraska
law directly on point, the court should have been free to choose
the rule of law most in accord with the present trends in the area
rather than choose to deny credit in the absence of any statutory
guidance.
It is obvious the court feared that to require credit to be given
in such a case would be an act of judicial legislation, perhaps to the
extent of upsetting the so-called "balance of power" or by usurping
a legislative function. But, the fact is, the court would not be
pioneering in an entirely new field as several courts in other juris-
dictions have already decided to require credit and they reached
this result without the aid of a statute.2 1 Actually, despite the
court's apparent reluctance to "make law," by holding as it did in
the absence of any binding authority, the court did in effect make
law in deciding against the allowance of credit.
The court then tries to ease the impact of the decision by as-
serting that if credit is to be required or even allowed, it should
be left solely to the discretion of the trial court.22  That the trial
20 The two main Nebraska cases cited by the court on which the other
cited cases all rely are McCormick v. State, 71 Neb. 505, 99 N.W. 237
(1904), and Knothe v. State, 115 Neb. 119, 211 N.W. 619 (1926). The
McCormick case was concerned with a situation where the defendant
was seeking credit for time served during a pendency of his proceeding
in error. It was decided that by his failure to obtain a suspension of
his sentence during such proceedings, he had waived any objection;
thus he was not punished twice for the same offense. In the Knothe
case the defendant was fined $100 and sentenced to a jail term for the
crime of boot-legging. The statutory punishment for the crime was
a fine of $100 or a jail term-not both. The court held that the double
sentence was void and the fact that the defendant had paid the fine
could not render it valid for any purpose. Since a void sentence is
treated as no sentence, the trial court was free to resentence the de-
fendant within its discretion and the statutory bounds. Thus in one
instance we have a situation which concerns a failure to follow stat-
utory procedure while the latter case is based upon the extinct "void
sentence doctrine."
21 See note 44, infra.
22 This strictly follows the theory that the trial court should be permitted
to use its discretion in matters concerning sentencing, and an appellate
court will not disturb the decision unless it be found that the trial
court grossly misused this discretion. E.g., State v. Burnside, 181 Neb.
20, 146 N.W.2d 754 (1966).
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court has discretion in this area would seem to be but an arbitrary
and superficial reason for the denial of credit by the appellate
court.23 In the majority of instances, discretion in the trial court
would be as effective to deny credit as an absolute prohibition.
By leaving the decision to the discretion of the trial court, credit
may, in effect, be entirely denied, since for all practical purposes
under our present system of courts, there is no way to ascertain
whether credit has been given, whether it has even been considered
or on what basis the decision as to the particular punishment rests.
Normally the record will show none of this, so there is nothing
in such a case as King on which an appellate court could base a
finding that the trial court abused its discretion. A misuse of this
discretionary power would be apparent only in those grossly un-
just cases that would not escape the scrutiny of an appellate
review regardless of the particular jurisdiction's law as to the pro-
priety of judicial review of the lower courts' sentencing procedures.
In any event, there should never be a rule that would encourage
or permit the trial court to disregard completely the more than
five years already served in prison by the defendant-appellant al-
most as if the that punishment had never existed.
The court further attempts to narrow its holding by a reference
to the fact that the total sentence to be served is within the statu-
tory bounds set by the legislature. 24  Though, as such, it may
strengthen the court's position, a showing that the questioned pro-
cedure still results in a total sentence within statutory bounds
does not relieve the legal result from a very close examination.25
Whether the defendant is required to serve one extra year in prison
or twenty should not be the determining factor. The inquiry
should be into the reasons for this increased punishment.
To further clarify its position as to a prisoner's rights and reme-
dies in post-conviction procedures, the court states the following
as being applicable to the general type of situation present in the
King case:
[I]n such a case the defendant has no assurance, and is entitled
to none as a matter of law, that he has everything to gain and
nothing to lose. In Shupe v. Sigler, this was pointed out in the
court's opinion as follows: "In conclusion, it should be pointed
out to Ar. Shupe and the many others who are filing petitions for
23 See Patton v. State, 256 F. Supp. 225, 227 (W.D.N.C. 1966); Agata, Time
Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal and a
Basis for Decision, 23 MoN. L. REV. 3, 14-16, 53-54 (1963); Whalen,
Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the
Laws, 35 MRNN. L. Ruv. 239, 253-54 (1951).
24 NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 28-414 (Reissue 1964).
25 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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a writ of habeas corpus in this court, that it is possible that some
may be doing themselves more harm than good. They may not
have 'nothing to lose and everything to gain' in filing for the
'great writ.' . . . For many of them the bright rainbow and the
hopes engendered by Fay v. Noia, and the other habeas corpus
cases recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, may
turn out to be an illusory rainbow with only a 'pot of fool's gold'
for its seeker."26
By quoting the above passage and emphasizing the "every-
thing to gain and nothing to lose" passage, the court would have us
believe the defendant should have to "gamble" to achieve a fair
and error free trial. The defendant is given a choice of waging the
years he has spent in prison against the chance of acquittal on re-
trial, the odds seemingly being in the state's favor; or on the other
hand the prisoner may remain in prison for the duration of his term,
forego any possibility of retrial, and thus maintain the status quo.
At least by taking the latter alternative the prisoner is assured that
his sentence will not exceed the term he is presently serving. The
only persons who may wish to gamble in such a situation are
those who, such as "lifers" and the prisoners on "death row," as a
matter of fact have nothing to lose and everything to gain.
In the opinion, the court does not state that it is attempting
to discourage appeals, nor is it contended that the court con-
sciously intends that to be the result, but it is extremely difficult
to infer otherwise from such a ruling. If the intent or even the
result is to discourage any person from availing himself of post-
conviction remedies, the holding in the King case would defi-
nitely be totally inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Con-
stitution as interpreted by recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions recognizing certain constitutional guarantees.27 Thus, the
King type of ruling is little more than a gimmick or ploy to limit
retroactive application of constitutional guarantees set forth in such
decisions as Gideon 28 and Massiah.
29
Although one of the main theories comprising the rationale
behind any type of punishment is deterrence, rulings and hold-
ings such as that in the King case put the idea of deterrence to a
new and unjustifiable application-to deter convicts from consum-
26 State v. King, 180 Neb. 631, 635, 144 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1966).
27 See Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v.
Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942). Both cases appear to hold that harsher
treatment of persons because they pursued post conviction remedies
to test constitutional claims is a violation of equal protection, contrary
to any legitimate governmental interest.
28 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
29 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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ing the state's time and money as well as clogging the courts. Such
an application presents a dual inquiry: (1) Is additional punish-
ment the proper instrument to be used as the means to achieve
the desired end and (2) does the state have any interest in the
likely actual result, namely the preservation of erroneous judg-
ments?
30
These inquiries are discussed in a very recent case, Patton v.
State,3 1 which answers both of them in the negative. In the Patton
case the facts are very similar to those before the Nebraska court
in the King case. Eddie Patton was convicted on armed robbery
and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Four years later Patton
was awarded a new trial on the basis of Gideon v. Wainwright
3 2
because at his first trial he requested a court-appointed attorney
and such request was denied. On retrial Patton was again sen-
tenced to a term of twenty years in prison. Even though the lower
court, as evidenced by the transcript,3 3 considered the prior impris-
onment, the appellate court, in an opinion written by Judge Craven,
held that a "denial of credit for time served while in the de facto
status of state prisoner is so fundamentally unfair as to constitute
a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution."34  The opinion con-
tinues by pointing out that the effect of the denial of credit "is to
inhibit the right to petition for a new trial." This is so, according
to Judge Craven, because other prsioners will conclude, whether
their conclusions be right or wrong, that the defendant was pun-
ished for obtaining a new trial. The good motives of the judges
are not enough and regardless of intentions, "the imposition of such
a penalty inhibits the right to petition for a new trial and unconsti-
tutionality conditions that right."3 5
Professor Van Aistyne has also suggested that a denial of
credit may well be within the ambit of the "equal protection"
clause.3 6  He feels that in light of the increased use of the equal
30 See generally People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963).
31 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966). See also Hill v. Holman, 255 F.
Supp. 924 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
32 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33 Patton v. State, 256 F .Supp. 225, 227 (W.D.N.C. 1966).
34 Id. at 236.
35 Id. at 236. The court cites as authority for its propositions: Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957);
United States ex rel Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965);
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963).
36 Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 636-39, (1965). See also Whalen,
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protection clause since 1950, it could well lend itself to application
in this area. In further developing his proposition, he suggests that
to be able to adjust the sentences of only those retried or resen-
tenced and not all of the prisoners is as basically unequal, though
less obvious, as if a state board were set up to review only the sen-
tences of Negro prisoners but to permit all others to stand. Fur-
ther, he suggests, generally to invoke the equal protection clause,
a showing need not be made of the underlying motives of the rule
under attack. Thus one should not have to show that the practice
is to deliberately frustrate post-conviction remedies. "It is enough
that the practice has that effect, and that it is not otherwise de-
fensible as a necessary means for effectuating legitimate public
policy.
' '37
Another, although perhaps at the present time weaker,38 con-
stitutional argument may be presented on the basis of "double
jeopardy" 39 or cruel and unusual punishment. '40  The gist of a
double jeopardy argument would necessarily resemble the follow-
ing: The conviction of a crime and the imposition of a specific sen-
tence amounts to an implied acquittal of any greater crime or
longer sentence for the same act. By seeking a post-conviction
Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the
Laws, 35 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1951).
37 Van Alstyne, supra note 36, at 639. "In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), there was no evidence that the requirement of a transcript for
appeal was imposed for the purpose of disabling indigents. It was
enough that the effect of the requirement was economically discrimin-
atory, that it affected a significant (statutory) right of appeal, and that
failure to provide free transcripts was not due to some compelling and
legitimate public policy unsusceptible to satisfaction by less discrim-
inatory alternative means. See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963)." Id. at n. 93.
38 It is a weaker argument in that as the law presently stands the "waiver
doctrine" is in full force. Although a defendant while he is serving a
prison term may not be subjected to a greater sentence for the same
offense, he is said to have "waived" this right by taking advantage of
post conviction remedies thus waiving any right as to the punishment
already inflicted, and any double jeopardy defense. E.g., King v.
United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938). This doctrine has been
criticized in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-94 (1957); Van
Alstyne, supra note 36, at 626-28 (1965); Agata, Time Served Under
a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal and a Basis for De-
cision, 25 MONT. L. REv. 3, 20-21 (1963).
39 As the double jeopardy clause of the Federal Constitution has not yet
been applied to the state, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937),
this argument would have to be based on NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
40 Any argument embodying the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause
would have to be based on the same "fairness" principles implicit in
the "due process" and "equal protection" arguments.
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remedy, the defendant should not be found to have waived this im-
plied acquittal. Thus, in effect the sentence at the first trial would
operate as an upper limit to bar by reason of double jeopardy any
punishment in excess of that awarded at the first trial. When
computing the time served, it would have to be the actual, total
time spent in prison plus the sentence imposed at the second trial.
41
The whole argument boils down to the proposition that consti-
tutional guarantees would mean nothing if one has to fear invoking
them. Thus in order to protect these "rights" from becoming
hollow, people should be protected in invoking them. If for no
other reason, a prisoner on retrial or on resentence should be en-
titled to credit just out of a sense of fairness and justice, as there
can be no legitimate reason to require a holding to the contrary
unless the state has some right to be "compensated" for the incon-
venience caused by retrial.42 Clearly such a reason is totally pre-
posterous and thus it would appear that, "since the state has no in-
terest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in fore-
closing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on
the right to appeal. '43 Denial of credit for time served can be little
more than such an unreasonable condition.
Since the highest court of Nebraska has made explicit its views
on the particular subject, the only open avenue to establish the re-
quirement of credit for time served in Nebraska may be through
the legislature. Although many jurisdictions have reached the de-
sired results without the aid of a statute,44 many states, in order to
codify the law, have enacted statutes requiring that credit be given
as a matter of law.45 The military in their code also have a section
41 Such an argument may be based on People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d
482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963), and Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957). Such an argument would have to stress the decreasing dis-
tinction between capital and non-capital cases such as evidenced by
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Even so, such an argument
may be difficult to maintain in the absence of a ruling, either on a
state or federal level, that a harsher punishment may not be imposed
on retrial.
42 See generally Agata, supra note 38. The author bases his arguments
that credit should be allowed almost entirely on non-constitutional and
equitable principles.
43 People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 497, 386 P.2d 677, 686 (1963).
44 The following jurisdictions have allowed credit for time served in cases
where the conviction was void and they did so in the absence of stat-
ute: Hill v. Holman, 255 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ala. 1966); Patton v. State,
256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966); Lassiter v. State, 166 So. 2d 159
(Fla. 1964); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922
(1952); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
45 Below is a partial listing of state statutes that require that credit be
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requiring credit, which code also prohibits a harsher punishment
on rehearing or resentence.4 6 Furthermore, the proposed Model Pe-
nal Code also deals with the problem and explicitly requires that
credit be granted.47
Regardless of how it is achieved, either by the courts or by the
legislature, Nebraska should establish a system for granting credit
for time served, as a matter of law. The rule of State v. King is
not fair.
PROPOSED STATUTE
Section (a) When a judgment of conviction is vacated, reversed, set
aside, or otherwise remanded and on retrial the defendant is again
convicted of the same crime, the maximum term of the new sentence
thereafter imposed shall be limited in duration by the sentence un-
der the vacated, reversed, set aside or otherwise remanded judg-
ment of conviction less any time defendant spent imprisoned un-
der such conviction and sentence.
Section (b) When a sentence is subsequently reversed, vacated, or
annulled, on resentencing the maximum term of the new sentence
thereafter imposed shall be limited in duration by the prior re-
versed, vacated, or annulled sentence less any time defendant spent
imprisoned under such sentence.
Section (c) This act shall also be a basis of review upon its ef-
fective date for any one presently imprisoned contrary to the pro-
vision of either section (a) or (b) of this act.
48
Jarret C. Oeltjen '68
allowed on retrial: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2728 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 2900.1 (West 1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 121-14 (Smith-Hurd
1964); IowA CODE ANN. § 793.26 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. § 197.041 (1962);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-34 (1960). This list is not meant to be ex-
haustive; for a more complete listing see Agata, supra note 38, at 65-68.
46 10 U.S.C. § 863(b) (1956).
47 MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.09 (a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
48 For other proposed statutes see Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed
Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 23 MONT.
L. REV. 3, 68-74 (1963); MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.09 (a) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
